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Devolution and Choice in Education
The research evidence to date1
Introduction
In many parts of the world, there have been attempts to move away from the
»one best system« of state funded and state provided education. Recent re-
forms have sought to dismantle centralised bureaucracies and create in their
place devolved systems of schooling with increased diversity in the types of
schools available, together with an increased emphasis on parental choice and
competition between schools (Whitty et al. 1998). This paper will review re-
cent evidence concerning the progress and effects of these currently fashion-
able »school autonomy« and »parental choice« agendas in contemporary edu-
cation policy in England and Wales, the USA and New Zealand2. School
autonomy, as used here, refers to school self-management through some or all
aspects of funding and decision-making being devolved from regional and dis-
trict offices to individual schools, whether to site-based professionals, commu-
nity-based school councils or a combination of both. In considering parental
choice, the paper will be particularly concerned with those policies that claim
to enhance opportunities for choice among state schools3 and those that use
public funds to extend choice into the private sector.
These policies are sometimes described as »privatisation« of the education
system. Nevertheless, if we look strictly at the issue of funding, or even at pro-
vision in most countries, it is difficult to argue that education has been privati-
sed on any significant scale (Whitty/Power 2000). In most cases, marketisation
is probably a better metaphor for what has been happening or, to be even more
precise, the development of »quasi-markets« in state funded and/or state provi-
ded services. Most commentators see these quasi-markets in education as in-
volving a combination of parental choice and school autonomy, together with a
greater or lesser degree of public accountability and government regulation.
These kinds of reforms have been evident in many mass education systems, in-
cluding those discussed in this paper. Levacic (1995) suggests that the distin-
1 This paper has been developed from parts of G. Whitty/S. Power/D. Halpin: Devolution
and Choice in Education: The school, the state and the market. Open University Press
1998, updated in the light of changes of policy and the findings of more recent research.
2 The paper draws upon findings from the authors’ research on autonomous schools in
England and Wales, New Zealand and the USA, together with a review of other relevant
research in all three countries. For a fuller discussion of the reforms in these countries,
and in Australia and Sweden, see Whitty et al. (1998).
3 In the remainder of this paper, we shall generally use the term »state schools« to de-
scribe publicly funded and publicly provided schools in England and New Zealand and
the term »public schools« to describe such schools in the USA.
guishing characteristics of a quasi-market for a public service are »the separati-
on of purchaser from provider and an element of user choice between provi-
ders«. She adds that a quasi-market usually remains highly regulated, with the
government controlling »such matters as entry by new providers, investment,
the quality of service (as with the national curriculum) and price, which is often
zero to the user« (p. 167). The lack of a conventional cash nexus and the
strength of government intervention distinguish quasi-markets from the ideali-
sed view of a »free« market, though few contemporary markets in any field are
actually free from government regulation and many of them involve some ele-
ment of overt or covert subsidy.
Nevertheless, even where quasi-markets are confined to public sector provi-
ders, it is possible to argue that some aspects of marketisation contribute to pri-
vatisation in an ideological if not a strictly economic sense. These include foster-
ing the belief that the private sector approach is superior to that traditionally
adopted in the public sector; requiring public sector institutions to operate mo-
re like those in the private sector; and encouraging private (individual/family)
decision-making in place of bureaucratic fiat. In other words, they define edu-
cation as a private good rather than a public issue and make education decisi-
on-making a matter of consumer choice rather than of citizen rights.
Advocates of quasi-markets argue that they will lead to increased diversity
of provision, better and more efficient management of schools, and enhanced
professionalism and school effectiveness. Some proponents, notably Moe
(1994) in the USA and Pollard (1995) in the UK, have argued that such re-
forms will bring particular benefits for families from disadvantaged communi-
ties, who have been ill-served by more conventional arrangements. However,
critics suggest that, even if they do enhance efficiency, responsiveness, choice
and diversity (and even that, they say, is questionable), they will almost certain-
ly increase inequality between schools. Before looking at some of the initial re-
search evidence on these matters, we shall outline the nature of the policies
pursued in the three countries under consideration.
Devolution and choice in three countries
In England, prior to the 1980s, the vast majority of children were educated in
state schools maintained by democratically elected local education authorities
(LEAs), which exercised political and bureaucratic control over their schools
but also often provided them with considerable professional support. After the
Conservative victory at the 1979 election, the Thatcher and Major govern-
ments set about trying to break the LEA monopoly of state schooling through
the provisions of a series of Education Acts passed in the 1980s and early
1990s.
Although the introduction of the National Curriculum and its associated sys-
tem of testing, together with the Ofsted inspection regime, can be seen as cen-
tralising measures, most of the other reforms have been designed to enhance
parental choice and transfer responsibilities from LEAs to individual schools
and parents. The earliest of these was the Assisted Places Scheme which provi-
ded public funding to enable academically able children from poor homes to
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attend some of the country’s elite private schools (see Edwards et al. 1989). It
is possible to argue that the sort of privatisation entailed within the Assisted
Places Scheme suppressed marketisation within the private sector by protecting
private schools from the full brunt of market forces. Indeed, some of the
schools that sought to join the Scheme were considered economically vulner-
able and one in Wales had to close before it could admit its first assisted place
holders (Whitty et al. 1998).
Subsequent legislation sought to create new forms of state school entirely
outside the influence of LEAs, and this marketisation of the public sector may
have reduced the distinctive nature of private schools and blurred the distincti-
on between the two sectors. City technology colleges (CTCs) were intended to
be new secondary schools for the inner city, with a curriculum emphasis on sci-
ence and technology and run by independent trusts with business sponsors. The
grant-maintained schools policy enabled existing state schools to »opt out« of
their LEAs after a parental ballot and run themselves with direct funding from
central government. Further legislation permitted schools to change their cha-
racter by varying their enrolment schemes, encouraged new types of specialist
schools and made it possible for some private schools to »opt in« to the state
system.
Local Management of Schools (LMS) gave many of those schools that re-
mained with their LEAs more control over their own budgets and day to day
management, receiving funds determined by the number and ages of their stu-
dents. Open enrolment allowed state schools to attract as many students as
possible, at least up to their physical capacity, instead of being kept to lower li-
mits or strict catchment areas in order that other schools could remain open.
This was seen as the necessary corollary of per capita funding in creating a qua-
si-market in education. In some respects, it was a »virtual voucher« system
(Sexton 1987), which was expected to make all schools more responsive to
their clients so that they either became more effective or closed.
Taken together these measures were widely expected to reduce the role of
LEAs to a marginal and residual one, but fewer schools left their LEAs than
anticipated. Even so, while claiming to have already increased diversity and
choice, Conservative prime minister Major looked forward to the day »when
all publicly funded schools will be run as free self-governing schools«. He belie-
ved in »trusting headmasters (sic), teachers and governing bodies to run their
schools and in trusting parents to make the right choice for their children«
(The Times, 24/8/95, p. 5). However, his government was defeated by Blair’s
New Labour Party in a General Election in May 1997. Yet, although it has
abolished the Assisted Places Scheme, the new government has maintained
most of the key features of the Conservative government’s approach, while in-
troducing more central government regulation of both schools and LEAs. In
the words of its leading education advisor, New Labour has sought to link »its
traditional concern with equality with a new recognition of diversity« (Barber
1997, p. 175).
By contrast with England, New Zealand in the 1980s was a somewhat sur-
prising context for a radical experiment in school reform, let alone one associa-
ted with a conservative agenda. Unlike in England and the USA, there was no
widespread disquiet about educational standards in the state school system nor
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were there the vast discrepancies in school performance that contributed to a
»moral panic« about urban education in those two countries. The initial re-
forms were introduced by a Labour government, albeit one that had enthusias-
tically embraced monetarism and »new public management« techniques,
following the Picot Report of 1988 (Wylie 1995). The education reforms, intro-
duced in October 1989, led to a shift in the responsibility for budget allocation,
staff employment and educational outcomes from central government and re-
gional educational boards to individual schools. Schools were given boards of
trustees that have effective control over their enrolment schemes, with even
lighter regulation than in England. However, Wylie (1994) argues that other
aspects of the New Zealand reforms »offer a model of school self-management
which is more balanced than the English experience«. This is because they put
»a great emphasis on equity … on community involvement … on parental in-
volvement [and on] partnership: between parents and professionals« (p. xv).
Furthermore, neither the costs of teachers’ salaries nor of some central support
services were devolved to individual school budgets, though there were subse-
quently moves in this direction after the election of a National Party admini-
stration in 1990. Only 3% of New Zealand schools were in a pilot scheme for
»bulk funding« (or devolution of 100% of their funding including teachers’ sa-
laries), but a »full funding« option was opened up to all schools in 1996 for a
trial period of three years and had attracted 20% of schools by 1998 (Wylie
1998a). Unlike the original English funding formulae, which funded schools on
the basis of average teacher salaries, the New Zealand scheme was based on
actual teacher salaries and a given teacher:student ratio. Alongside these re-
forms, national curriculum guidelines were introduced but these were far less
detailed and prescriptive than the English model and paid more attention to
minority Maori interests. However, an ambitious outcome-based national as-
sessment system was introduced, as was a new approach to inspection by the
Education Review Office. The extension of choice into the private sector be-
gan in 1996 with a New Zealand equivalent of the Assisted Places Scheme, call-
ed Targeted Individual Entitlement involving about a third of private schools,
leading to claims that it marked »the start of a move towards a voucher system
in which schools compete for parents’ education dollar« (Wellington Evening
Post, 28/9/95). Wylie (1999a) suggests that, taken together, New Zealand poli-
cies now add up to a »quasi-voucher system«. How far the recently-elected La-
bour/Alliance party coalition government will significantly change these poli-
cies remains to be seen.
In the USA, the limited role of the federal government in relation to educa-
tion makes it harder to generalise about the nature and provenance of policies
designed to enhance parental choice and devolve decision-making to schools.
The more significant decisions are taken at state and district levels. While a
few states, such as Minnesota, have state-wide choice plans, many initiatives
have been more local. Wells (1993) demonstrates the huge variety in origins
and likely effects of the various choice plans that have been mooted or imple-
mented in the US over the past few years. Similarly, American specialist or »fo-
cus« schools have very different origins and purposes (Raywid 1994; Hill/Fo-
ster/Gendler 1990). They include long-standing specialty schools, such as the
Boston Latin School and New York’s highly academic Stuyvesant High School,
102 Teil II: Bildungskonomie
magnet schools associated with desegregation plans, alternative schools, some-
times based on progressive pedagogic principles, and private Catholic schools.
The nature of the more recent wave of semi-autonomous charter schools that
have developed in many states and that of site-based management within
school districts also varies considerably (Wohlstetter et al. 1995; Wells et al.
1999; Johnson/Landman 2000). A variety of programmes to enable low-in-
come families to choose private schools have also become a feature of urban
education in the US. In addition to the two controversial publicly funded sche-
mes in Milwaukee and Cleveland, over 30 cities now have privately-funded
schemes (Peterson 1998).
Devolution and choice in the US enlists significant support from progressi-
ve forces, particularly amongst those representing minority ethnic groups. The
mixed evidence about the efficacy and effects of desegregation and magnet
schools in the 1980s (Blank 1990; Moore/Davenport 1990) has sometimes
led to the conclusion that enhanced parental voice and choice, rather than
more concerted political intervention, will provide the best chance of educa-
tional salvation for minority parents and their children. Moe (1994) goes so
far as to claim that the best hope for the poor to gain the right »to leave bad
schools and seek out good ones« is through an »unorthodox alliance« with
»Republicans and business … who are the only powerful groups willing to
transform the system« (p. 33). For this reason, some aspects of the current re-
form agenda have developed a populist appeal well beyond the coteries of
conservative politicians or even the white populations to which they usually
appeal. Goldhaber (1999) reports that, for the first time, a plurality of survey
respondents favoured the use of vouchers for private school tuition (Rose/
Gallup 1999).
In so far as it is possible to generalise, then, the New Zealand reforms have
ushered in a more thorough-going experiment in free parental choice in the
state sector than has been tried in England, while both these countries have
gone further in this respect than all but a few school districts in the USA. In
terms of freedom from local bureaucratic control, New Zealand schools have
the most autonomy and those in the USA the least. Within England, grant main-
tained schools (now renamed »foundation schools« by the New Labour govern-
ment) have the most autonomy, but even mainstream LEA schools, which vir-
tually all now have local management, have considerably more autonomy than
most US schools even after the re-regulation introduced by New Labour. As
for freedom in financial management, English schools operating under LMS or
Labour’s new »fair funding« regime have more resources under their direct
control than even New Zealand schools, apart from those in the latter group
participating in the »full funding« trials. In the USA, financial devolution with-
in school districts has not gone nearly as far as it has in either England or New
Zealand. In that respect, little of the American experience of site-based man-
agement is directly relevant to the claims made by advocates of more radical
supply side reforms. What may be instructive, though, is the increasing use of
for-profit companies in the running of public schools. Within the UK this is a
relatively recent phenomenon and currently there is only one »privately-run«
publicly funded school – although more are envisaged. In the US, though, for-
profit companies are the fastest growing sector of the charter school movement
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(Ascher/Power 2000). An additional development in the States which may be-
come more widespread is the growth of »homeschooling« (Apple 2000) – per-
haps an example of privatisation in its most literal sense.
Finally, equity considerations have had different degrees of influence in the
three countries. For example, »race« has been a much more influential issue in
the USA and New Zealand than it has in England where a government minis-
ter dismissed concerns about the possibility of racial segregation with the state-
ment that her government did not wish »to circumscribe [parental] choice in
any way« (quoted in Blackburne 1988). It has influenced policies in New Zea-
land (in terms of funding and community influence) and in the USA (in relati-
on to funding and enrolment policies) far more than it has in England. Thus, in
a number of US states, charter law included provisions stipulating that charter
schools reflect the racial balance in the surrounding district, or that these
schools give priority to »at risk« students.
We now consider the limited evidence that is available about the effects of
recent policies to encourage parental choice and school self-management in
these three countries.
Research on the effects of reform
In England and Wales, there is nothing to suggest that any gains have been sub-
stantial even in relation to the claims that the reforms would lead to more ef-
fective use of resources. A national study conducted by Birmingham University
and funded by the National Association of Head Teachers was generally positi-
ve about the impact of LMS but conceded that direct evidence of the influence
of self-management on learning was »elusive«. The team’s initial survey (Ar-
nott et al. 1992) showed that the vast majority of headteachers agreed with the
statement that »local management allows schools to make more effective use
of its resources«. However, a majority also felt that meetings were being taken
up by administrative issues which lessened their attention to students’ learning.
They were thoroughly divided on the question of whether »children’s learning
is benefiting from local management«. Thus, it was rather unclear what their
concept of greater effectiveness actually related to.
The results cited here came mainly from headteacher respondents, whose
authority has been greatly enhanced by the self-management reform. It may be
significant that the relatively few classroom teachers who were interviewed by
the Birmingham research team were far more cautious about the benefits of
LMS for student learning and overall standards. An independently funded stu-
dy (Levacic 1995) found headteachers generally welcomed self-management
even where their school had lost resources as a result of it, while classroom
teachers were sceptical about its benefits even in schools which had gained
in resources. Levacic concludes that, although local management enhances
cost-efficiency, there is »a lack of strong theoretical argument and empirical
evidence« to show that it improves the quality of teaching and learning, as
claimed by the government (Levacic 1995, p. xi).
In the final report of the Birmingham study (Bullock/Thomas 1994), relati-
vely more headteachers claimed improvements in student learning, but signifi-
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cantly these seem to be associated with increased funding rather than self-ma-
nagement per se. While the Birmingham team concluded that self-management
was broadly a successful reform, they argued that more evidence was needed
on the relationship between resourcing levels and learning outcomes. This
seems particularly important in that the schools most affected by budgetary dif-
ficulties, and therefore least likely to report a positive impact on students’
learning, were often found to be those with students from disadvantaged back-
grounds.
The Birmingham study echoes some of the concerns expressed by Le
Grand/Bartlett (1993) in their study of quasi-markets in social policy. Bart-
lett (1993) points out that, although parental choice has been increased by
open enrolment, »the door is firmly closed once a school [is full]. And by en-
couraging an increasingly selective admissions policy in [over-subscribed]
schools open enrolment may have the effect of bringing about increased oppor-
tunities for cream-skimming and hence inequality«. Furthermore, he found that
»those schools which faced financial losses under the formula funding system
tended to be schools which drew the greatest proportion of students from the
most disadvantaged section of the community« (Bartlett 1993). Thus, what-
ever gains may have emerged from the reforms in terms of efficiency and re-
sponsiveness to some clients, there were serious concerns about their implicati-
ons for equity.
The danger of »cream skimming« is clearly demonstrated in an important
series of studies by Ball and his colleagues on the operation of quasi-markets
in London. In an early study, Bowe et al. (1992) suggested that schools were
competing to attract greater cultural capital and thus hoping for higher yielding
returns. Subsequently, Gewirtz et al. (1995) have shown schools seeking stu-
dents who are »able«, »gifted«, »motivated and committed«, and middle class,
with girls and children with South Asian backgrounds being seen as particular
assets in terms of their potential to enhance test scores. The least desirable
clientele include those who are »less able«, have special educational needs,
especially emotional and behavioural difficulties, as well as children from
working class backgrounds and boys, unless they also have some of the more
desirable attributes.
There is certainly evidence that some schools discriminate against children
with special educational needs (Feintuck 1994). Bartlett (1993) argues that
only if the market price varies with the needs of the client will this not happen.
In other words, funding formulae need to be weighted to give schools an incen-
tive to take more expensive children. The current premium paid for children
with special educational needs may not be enough, if it makes the school less
popular with clients who, although bringing in less money, bring in other desir-
able attributes. Bowe et al. (1992) and Vincent et al. (1995) give examples of
schools making just this sort of calculation.
The academically able are the »cream« that most schools seek to attract.
Such students stay in the system longer and thus bring in more money, as well
as making the school appear successful in terms of its test scores and hence at-
tractive to other desirable clients. Glennerster (1991) suggests that, given the
opportunity, most schools will want to become more selective because taking
children who will bring scores down will affect their overall market position.
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This is especially so when there is imperfect information about school effecti-
veness and when only »raw« test scores are made available as they have been
hitherto in England. Schools with the highest scores appear best even if other
schools enhance achievement more.
Partly because of this ranking system on a uni-dimensional scale of acade-
mic excellence, there is little evidence that choice policies are fostering hori-
zontal diversity in schooling. Glatter et al. (1997) found no evidence of grea-
ter diversity of provision, except where there was specific government funding
for specialist schools. In some cases, they identified a tendency towards greater
uniformity between schools. Some commentators have even predicted that, ra-
ther than choice leading to more diverse and responsive forms of provision as
claimed by many of its advocates, it will reinforce the existing hierarchy of
schools, based on academic test results and social class (Walford/Miller
1991).
Those parents who are in a position to choose are choosing those schools
that are closest to the traditional academic model of education that used to be
associated with selective grammar schools. Even new types of school tend to be
judged in these terms. Our research showed many parents choosing CTCs not
so much for their hi-tech image, but because they were perceived as the next
best thing to grammar schools or even elite private schools (Whitty et al.
1993). In this situation, those schools that are in a position to choose often seek
to identify their success with an emphasis on traditional academic virtues and
thus attract those students most likely to display them. Many of the first
schools to opt out and become grant maintained were selective, single sex and
with traditional sixth forms and this gave the sector an aura of elite status (Fitz
et al. 1993). Some grant maintained comprehensive schools subsequently rever-
ted to being overtly academically selective, and Bush et al. (1993) suggested
that 30% of the grant maintained »comprehensive« schools they investigated
were using covert selection. In addition, grant maintained schools were identi-
fied as amongst those with the highest rates of exclusion of existing students
and amongst the least willing to cater for students with special educational
needs (Feintuck 1994). Recent research by Levacic/Hardman (1999) also re-
veals that the examination results of these schools rose as the proportion of so-
cio-economically disadvantaged children within them declined. To that extent
they can hardly claim to have increased parental choice and pupil performance
across the board (Power et al. 1994).
Walford (1992) argues that, while choice will lead to better quality
schooling for some children, the evidence so far suggests that it will »discri-
minate in particular against working class children and children of Afro-Ca-
ribbean descent« (p. 137). Smith/Noble (1995) also conclude from the evi-
dence that English choice policies are further disadvantaging already
disadvantaged groups. Although schools have always been socially and racial-
ly segregated to the extent that residential segregation exists, Gewirtz et al.
(1995) suggest that choice may well exacerbate this segregation by extending
it into previously integrated schools serving mixed localities. Their research
indicates that working class children and particularly children with special
educational needs are likely to be increasingly »ghetto-ised« in poorly-resour-
ced schools.
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Although it is argued that schemes such as the Assisted Places Scheme al-
low able and meritorious working class children to »escape« from such schools,
they have been shown to attract relatively few children from such backgrounds
(Edwards et al. 1989). Furthermore, the existence of such escape routes redu-
ces the pressure to improve the schools in which the majority of working class
children continue to be educated, thus potentially increasing the overall polari-
sation of standards of provision. The Smithfield Project, a major government-
funded study of the impact of choice policies in New Zealand, has suggested
that much the same sort of social polarisation is taking place there (Lauder et
al. 1994, Waslander/Thrupp 1995). In another New Zealand study (Fowler
1993), schools located in low socio-economic areas were found to be judged ne-
gatively because of factors over which they had no influence, such as type of in-
take, location and problems perceived by parents as linked to these. Wylie
(1994) too noted that schools in low income areas in New Zealand are more
likely to be losing students to other schools. If we could be sure that their poor
reputation was deserved, this might be taken as evidence that the market was
working well with effective schools reaping their just rewards. But, as in Eng-
land, judgements of schools tend to be made on social grounds or narrow aca-
demic criteria and with little reference to their overall performance or even
their academic effectiveness on value-added measures. The funding regime ma-
kes it extremely difficult for schools in disadvantaged areas to break out of the
cycle of decline and this exacerbates the problems facing teachers and students
remaining in them. Wylie’s study of the fifth year of self-managing schools in
New Zealand (Wylie 1994) identified schools in low income areas, and schools
with high Maori enrolments, as experiencing greater resource problems than
others.
Wylie (1994, 1995) reported that quasi-markets had led to state schools
paying more attention to the attractiveness of physical plant and public image
than to changes in teaching and learning other than the spread of computers.
Even by the seventh year study in 1996, only 34 percent of primary school
principals and 24 percent of teachers thought the reforms had had »a major
positive impact on the quality of children’s learning in school« (Wylie 1997).
As in England, schools that had increasing or stable rolls (and funding) were
much more likely to report positive impacts than those that were losing stu-
dents. And, again, schools with low socio-economic status intakes were more
likely to have lost out and, significantly, there had been a slight decline in
Maori student achievement in the period since the reforms were introduced
(Wylie 1998a).
Wylie has noted that the reforms »do not seem able to counter or outweigh
factors affecting school rolls which lie beyond school power, such as local
demographics affected by employment, ethnicity, and class« (Wylie 1995, cit-
ing Gordon 1994, Waslander/Thrupp 1995). The lack of any marked impro-
vement in overall standards and the continued existence of socially-patterned
achievement gaps has led her to argue that placing school self-management at
the centre of educational reform is unlikely to bring significant gains in effecti-
veness in the absence of other changes (Wylie 1998a). Furthermore, there
seems to be little to suggest that market mechanisms are the key, either to the
improvement of failing schools or to enhanced achievement for disadvantaged
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students. Schools which were most positive about the reforms were those that
had »co-operative rather than competitive relations with other schools« (Wy-
lie 1997, p. 1). Policies of enhancing what Wylie terms »family choice« have
»done little to substantially improve access to more desirable schools for Mao-
ri or low-income students« (Wylie 1999b, p. 13). In a 1999 survey, they were
found to be significantly less likely to have received their first choice of school
than other students. Nor have the policies improved conditions at the schools
most such students actually attend. Indeed, she concludes »the policies appear
to have made things somewhat worse for the very group intended to benefit
most from them« (Wylie 1999b, p. 13). Wylie (1998b) also cites an evaluation
by Smith/Gaffney (1997) as showing that, although the Targeted Individual
Entitlement Scheme to give private school places to low income families was
somewhat better targeted than its English equivalent, it attracted relatively fe-
wer Maori and Pacific Island children than those from other low income
groups.
Overall, this work suggests that many of the differences between schools re-
sult from factors largely beyond the control of parents and schools, except the
power of advantaged parents and advantaged schools to further enhance their
advantage and thus increase educational inequalities and social polarisation.
This does not necessarily mean that devolution and choice will need to be ent-
irely abandoned in New Zealand, but it is clear that they need to be accompa-
nied by other policies. As in England, the weaknesses of the policies have al-
ready produced a degree of re-regulation on the part of central government,
but this has so far taken the form of tightened inspection and technical control
through more prescriptive curriculum and assessment policies (Wylie 1998a;
McKenzie 1999). The research points to a need for far more support for disad-
vantaged schools and concerted collaboration between government and schools
rather than the current segmentation of responsibility. Furthermore, procedu-
res for selection to oversubscribed schools need reconsideration. Significantly,
the Smithfield Project found that, only in one year where allocations to over-
subscribed schools were based on »balloting« (or drawing lots), did social pola-
risation between popular and unpopular schools decrease.
Some of these findings have been challenged by Gorard/Fitz (1998a, b)
who have claimed that the tendency towards increased polarisation in both
England and Wales and New Zealand may have been merely an initial effect
of marketisation policies and that social polarisation has actually been reduced
in subsequent years. However, Noden (2000) has argued that his own more ro-
bust methodology paints a less positive picture. Using an index of isolation, ra-
ther than the index of dissimilarity employed by Gorard/Fitz, Noden claims
that between 1994 and 1999 English secondary schools experienced a signifi-
cant increase in socio-economic segregation. Then, just as we were finalising
this paper, Gorard/Fitz themselves reported that the most recent statistics
showed evidence of renewed social polarisation (Cassidy 2000)4. Educational
polarisation has anyway been confirmed in the case of England by Her Maje-
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4 Taking the findings overall, Gorard’s current position is that »The advent of choice may
be truly both less beneficial than some advocates suggest, and less harmful than some
critics fear« (cited in Cassidy 2000).
sty’s Chief Inspector of Schools (HMCI 1998) and the 1998 GCSE public ex-
amination results there brought an increase in the failure rate alongside an in-
crease in the numbers gaining high grade passes. And, despite some outstand-
ing exceptions, it remains the case that schools located in contexts of multiple
disadvantage have overall levels of performance well below the national aver-
age and tend to be relatively ineffective at boosting students’ progress (Gray
1998; Gibson/Asthana 1998). The problems and dilemmas facing schools with
large numbers of disadvantaged students, compared with those with advan-
taged intakes, are much greater than current policies acknowledge (Proud-
ford/Baker 1995; Thrupp 1995, 2000).
In the USA, despite the early association of public school choice with racial
desegregation, there are considerable concerns about the equity effects of more
recent attempts to enhance choice, especially as there is no clear evidence to
date of a positive impact on student achievement. What evidence there is about
the effects of choice policies on student achievement and equity continues to
be at best inconclusive (Plank et al. 1993), notwithstanding claims by choice
advocates that »the best available evidence« shows that parental choice impro-
ves the education of all children, especially low income and minority students
(Domanico 1990).
Even some of the more positive evidence from controlled choice districts,
such as Cambridge (Rossell/Glenn 1988) and Montclair (Clewell/Joy 1990),
which seemed to show gradual overall achievement gains, has subsequently
been regarded as methodologically flawed (Henig 1994) making it difficult to
attribute improvements to choice per se. Furthermore, although choice has not
always led to resegregation as its critics feared, improvements in the racial ba-
lance of Montclair and Cambridge schools were most noticeable during periods
of strong government intervention. Henig goes on to argue that the much
vaunted East Harlem »miracle« (Fliegel 1993) has »escaped any serious effort
at controlled analysis« even though it has had a special role »in countering
charges that the benefits of choice programs will not accrue to minorities and
the poor« (p. 142). Not only have the apparently impressive gains in achieve-
ment now levelled off or even been reversed, it is impossible to be sure that
the earlier figures were not merely the effect of schools being able to choose
students from higher socio-economic groups from outside the area. There are
certainly grounds for suggesting that public choice programmes will eventually
lead to increasing segregation of schools. In a recent review of the American
research, Goldhaber (1999, p. 21) argues that »existing empirical evidence on
who chooses« generally shows choice (in any of its forms) to be highly correla-
ted with socio-economic status. His own research (Goldhaber 1996) also
points to a racial dimension in that parents tend to prefer schools with a higher
proportion of white students.
Research on the effects of school autonomy in the US is also inconclusive,
not least because the degree of autonomy granted to mainstream public
schools with site-based management is, as we have seen, substantially lower
than in England or New Zealand. As for the growing number of publicly fun-
ded charter schools, Goldhaber (1999) argues that it is too early to undertake
quantitative assessments of their impact and points out that most claims of suc-
cess tend to be based on anecdote. However, while there is little to suggest
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these schools have been particularly mould-breaking, neither have they be-
come the elite institutions many feared (OERI 1997).
The American evidence with regard to private school choice is contentious,
but highly relevant to our concerns in view of current demands for an extensi-
on of the use of public funds to permit students to attend private schools. Much
of the controversy centres around the various interpretations of the data from
Coleman’s high school studies (Coleman et al. 1982) and, in particular, the
work of Chubb/Moe (1990). Henig (1994) argues that the small advantage at-
tributed to private schools is a product of the methodology used. Lee/Bryk
(1993) also suggest Chubb/Moe’s conclusions are not supported by the eviden-
ce as presented. Nevertheless, Bryk et al. (1993) claim on the basis of their
own work that private Catholic schools do impact positively on the performan-
ce of low income families but they attribute this at least as much to an ethos of
strong community values antithetical to the marketplace as to the espousal of
market forces. Witte’s evaluation of the Milwaukee »voucher« scheme mentio-
ned earlier, which enables children from poor families to choose private
schools at public expense, concluded that »in terms of achievement scores …
students perform approximately the same as M[ilwaukee] P[ublic] S[chool] stu-
dents«. However, attendance of choice children is slightly higher and parental
satisfaction has been high. For the schools, »the program has generally been
positive, has allowed several to survive, several to expand, and contributed to
the building of a new school« (Witte at al. 1994). Yet neither Witte’s own con-
clusions nor Greene and his colleagues’ rather more positive reworking of the
data (Greene/Peterson 1996; Greene et al. 1998) can be used to sustain some
of the more extravagant claims made both for and against this type of pro-
gramme. It is a small and narrowly targeted programme and certainly not, of it-
self, a sufficient basis upon which to judge the likely effects of a more tho-
rough-going voucher initiative.
The Milwaukee program overall has not hitherto been oversubscribed and,
although students are self-selected, the schools involved have not been in a po-
sition to exercise choice. Elsewhere, the combination of oversubscription and
self-selection in explaining apparent performance gains through private school
choice suggest that equity is a major issue as it is in England and New Zealand.
Smith/Meier (1995) use existing data to test the school choice hypothesis and
conclude that »competition between public and private schools appears to re-
sult in a cream skimming effect« and that there is no reason to expect that the
same will not happen with enhanced public school choice.
Overall, this review of the research evidence seems to suggest that the bene-
fits of the reforms have so far been limited and that their costs, particularly for
disadvantaged groups, have been considerable. The extravagant claims of the
proponents of reform about its potential system-wide benefits have certainly
not so far been realised. In making this claim, we are, of course, generalising
from the evidence available. There can be no doubt that some individual disad-
vantaged children have benefited from the reforms. There are also instances
where reforms to public education systems have made a positive difference to
the educational experiences of whole groups of students and teachers. The Ku-
ra Kaupapa Maori in New Zealand and some of the »alternative« US charter
schools provide examples where self-determination by communities and pro-
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fessionals has brought about innovative and potentially empowering educatio-
nal environments. However, there are doubts as to the sustainability of such
programmes and about the extent to which they can be attributed to quasi-mar-
kets rather than to other changes. Moreover, these innovative instances need
to be set alongside a prevailing pattern of educational conservatism and conso-
lidated hierarchies both within and between schools.
Beyond quasi-markets?
Advocates of market forces have argued that the indifferent performance of
the reforms so far is merely evidence that they have not gone far enough. Thus,
some commentators from the radical right see the answer as moving still fur-
ther towards more genuinely marketised and even fully privatised forms of
education provision. For example, a government Minister responsible for the
introduction of the Assisted Places Scheme in England used our own research
(Edwards et al. 1989) showing that it had failed to attract many working class
students as a basis for arguing in favour of a fully-fledged voucher scheme
(Boyson 1990). Similarly, Moe’s (1994) only major criticism of the British re-
forms was that the government had »created an open enrolment system in
which there is very little to choose from, because the supply of schools is con-
trolled by the LEAs«. In order to free up the supply side, he suggested that all
schools should become autonomous. Tooley (1996) favours an even more dere-
gulated system and the abandonment of a centrally prescribed curriculum.
Much of the support for moving further towards decentralising education
provision derives from the alleged benefits of private provision. As we discus-
sed earlier, the evidence with regard to existing schemes of private school
choice is contentious. In discussing the US experience, Wylie (1998b) argues
that »it is difficult to keep voucher schemes limited to low income or minority
groups« (p. 57). It is therefore important to try to model the effects of wider
schemes. Even if we accept that some children who currently attend state
schools might benefit from private education, there is little to suggest that ex-
tending opportunities to attend private schools more widely would benefit all
groups equally. Witte at al. (1995) have undertaken an analysis of the current
social composition of private and public schools in the American state of Wis-
consin and conclude that »an open-ended voucher scheme would clearly bene-
fit households that are more affluent than the average household in Wiscon-
sin«. They go on to say that, although some might believe that making
vouchers available to everyone would open up private schools to the poor, the
opposite argument seems equally plausible. With more money available, priva-
te schools that cannot currently afford to select, such as some of the inner city
private schools in the Milwaukee choice experiment, could become more selec-
tive. The already highly selective schools could then maintain their advantage
by demanding add-on payments in addition to vouchers5.
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of both selection and fee levels in connection with existing schemes has been unpopular
with the private school lobby in all three countries.
Some on the right argue that these processes are inevitable in a system that
is only partly privatised. Tooley (1995) claims that the potential of markets in
education cannot be properly assessed by looking at the effects of quasi-mar-
kets, or what he prefers to term »so-called« markets. In his own vision of Edu-
cation Without the State (Tooley 1996) he argues that we need a »one tier pri-
vate system« and that parents and students should be free to determine the
kind of schooling they feel suits them best. He envisages lowering the school
leaving age and providing every student with a »lifelong individual fund for
education« which they would then be able to spend when and where they saw
fit. Tooley is right to remind us of the equity failings of existing democratic
systems and, of course, research on current systems does not, indeed in princi-
ple could not, show that total deregulation would not have beneficial effects.
Yet, most of the available evidence does seem to suggest that going further in
the direction of marketisation and privatisation would be unlikely to yield
overall improvements in the quality of education and might well have damag-
ing equity effects. Recently, Tooley (2000) has criticised our 1998 book, partly
because he does not entirely believe the evidence we cite, but mainly because
it relates to a situation where markets are not fully deregulated in the manner
he favours.
Yet, even Chubb/Moe (1990), who argue that equality is better »protected«
by markets than political institutions, concede that choice of school in a demo-
cracy cannot be unlimited or entirely unregulated. The need to provide a ba-
lance between consumer rights and citizen rights in education, while recognis-
ing the desirability of some facets of choice and devolution, has already led in
England to proposals to put a greater degree of democratic control back in the
picture. In particular, there has been discussion around how to revive democra-
tic involvement and accountability at local level as a counter-balance to the
market and the strong central state. For example, Pryke (1996) remarks that,
»despite the experiments to let schools do their own thing« – and he believes
this has gone further in England than anywhere else in the world – »the great
majority of them, and parents, have recognised the need for a body to act for
them as a community of schools« (p. 21). Similarly, Brighouse (1996), Birming-
ham’s senior education officer, who argues that an atomised market will create
chaos and »put further distance between the educational and social haves and
the educational and social have-nots«, says that »there needs to be a local
agency aware of school differences, sensitively working with each school, secur-
ing equity and setting a climate for a drive towards ever higher standards« (p.
11). Responding to the question as to why such bodies should be democratical-
ly accountable, he suggests that in matters of education provision »there is a
need to balance various and sometimes conflicting needs and priorities (includ-
ing) the needs of very different communities within, for example, a modern
city« and that difference and equity can best be seen to be held in balance in
an openly democratic forum (p. 14).
Part of the challenge for those adopting this view must be to move away
from atomised decision-making to the reassertion of collective responsibility
without recreating the very bureaucratic systems whose shortcomings have
helped to legitimate the tendency to treat education as a private good rather
than a public responsibility. While choice policies are part of a social text that
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helps to create new subject positions which undermine traditional forms of col-
lectivism, those forms of collectivism themselves failed to empower many
members of society, including women and minority ethnic groups. We need to
ask how we can use the positive aspects of choice and autonomy to facilitate
the development of new forms of community empowerment rather than ex-
acerbating social differentiation. As Henig (1994) says of the USA, »the sad
irony of the current education-reform movement is that, through overidentifi-
cation with school-choice proposals rooted in market-based ideas, the healthy
impulse to consider radical reforms to address social problems may be channel-
ed into initiatives that further erode the potential for collective deliberation
and collective response« (p. 222). Yet some reform proposals that may seem
superficially to have similarities with neo-liberal policies of marketisation and
privatisation (e.g. Cookson 1994; Atkinson 1997) could become articulated
with a rather different political agenda and potentially make a positive con-
tribution to the enhancement of social justice in education.
In this context, it may well be possible to identify progressive moments
within policies that foster devolution and choice. This potential was recognised
in some of the early moves towards devolution in New Zealand, but the subse-
quent evidence suggests that it is difficult to realise progressive moments at
school site level in a situation of diminishing resources and when the broader
political climate is pointing in the opposite direction. Atomised decision-mak-
ing in a highly stratified society may appear to give everyone equal opportuni-
ties, but transferring responsibility for decision-making from the public to the
private sphere can actually reduce the possibility of collective action to impro-
ve the quality of education for all. Thus, while some forms of devolution and
choice may warrant further exploration as ways of realising the legitimate aspi-
rations of disadvantaged groups, they are unlikely to be able to counteract the
effects of wider structural inequalities on a sustained and consistent basis. Lau-
der et al. (1998) have argued for a »contextual model« for research on school
effectiveness which, while recognising that individual schools can and do some-
times make a difference, would explore the specific conditions under which
school processes are or are not relatively autonomous from wider social and
political processes.
Meanwhile, in seeking out ways of responding to this challenge in policy
terms, many are looking with enthusiasm to Britain where the New Labour go-
vernment seems to be drawing on critiques of both traditional social democra-
tic forms and neo-liberal market forms to develop a so-called »Third Way«
(Giddens 1998). In the light of concerns about some of the negative equity ef-
fects of quasi-markets, the New Labour government promised to move beyond
the »ruthless free-for-all« of the neo-liberals. However, rather than revisiting
the »stifling statism« of »Old Labour«, the Blair government has claimed to
be developing policies on the basis of »what works« rather than being driven
by any one ideological approach. It is possible to find, for example, in its Edu-
cation Action Zones, both a reassertion of collective responsibility for educa-
tional provision and a readiness to consider the active involvement of private
(even »for profit«) companies in its delivery. And, although the government
has abandoned the Assisted Places Scheme in order to uphold its commitment
to »benefit the many, not the few«, it has sought to bring private and state
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schools into closer partnership. It is of course too early to predict the outcomes
of New Labour’s programme of educational reform, but there is little evidence
yet that its mixture of apparently discordant strategies has succeeded in
delivering the benefits of devolution and choice without maintaining or even
exacerbating existing patterns of inequality. Tooley (2000) is therefore right to
raise questions about the capacity of existing policies to deliver, but his own
entirely privatised free market alternative is surely not the only option left.
Nor, we suspect, is it one that those countries in Europe and the Pacific Rim
with successful and relatively equitable education systems would even contem-
plate.
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